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Summary
This paper surveys Parties’ intended nationally 
determined contributions (INDCs) to gauge the 
potential scope of market mechanisms in the 
forthcoming Paris agreement. A chart and table 
annexed to the paper gives an overview of all 
countries.
At the time of writing, 147 Parties had submit­
ted INDCs. Among these, 66 are planning and 
20 are considering to use international market 
mechanisms.  
While 86 is a high number, the vast majority in­
tend to be sellers in the carbon market. In addi­
tion, these countries are mostly low-income
countries which have so far not had much suc­
cess in using the CDM. Only thirteen Parties in­
tend to buy units: Canada, Costa Rica, Japan,
Liechtenstein, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, New 
Zealand, Norway, San Marino, South Korea,
Switzerland, and Turkey. Notably, only about 
half of them are large emitters.
Five Parties that do not intend to use interna­
tional mechanisms highlight their use of do­
mestic systems: China, EU, Gabon, Iceland and 
India. In addition, a number of countries envis­
age using both international and domestic sys­
tems: Belize, Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, Liechten­
stein, New Zealand, Norway and South Korea.
What this indicates is that there are ongoing 
dynamics at national and sub-national levels,
but demand for units from international mech­
anisms continues to be low, the decline of their 
role is therefore unlikely to be reversed soon.
Of the Parties that may use international mech­
anisms, the majority does not specify which 
mechanisms they intend to use. 23 Parties spec­
ify the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
six reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation (REDD+), four the new mar­
ket mechanism (NMM), four (credited) national­
ly appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs), and 
one the Framework for Various Approaches 
(FVA). 
There is thus a comparatively strong call for 
continuation of the CDM. The low-income 
countries that want to use mechanisms as 
sellers may indeed not have much scope for 
mechanisms at sectoral level, as envisaged for 
the NMM.
While the INDCs do not necessarily deliver a full 
picture, using them as basis suggests that re­
form of the existing CDM and capacity building 
for its use by low-income countries may be a 
significantly higher priority than development 
of new mechanisms.  
Large emitters are apparently taking the route 
of domestic emission trading systems rather 
than international mechanisms. While domestic 
emission trading systems could in theory be 
linked with each other, based on the current 
political discussions these will in practice for the 
foreseeable future probably be limited to the 
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1 Introduction  
Market mechanisms – the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) 
and Art. 17 emission trading – have been a cen­
tral feature of the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) intend to adopt a 
new comprehensive climate agreement at this 
year’s Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris.
The shape of the new agreement is emerging 
only slowly, including the role market mecha­
nisms will play. 
On 1 October 2015, the UNFCCC’s soft deadline 
for submitting intended nationally determined 
contributions (INDCs) ended. As of the time of
writing, 147 Parties had provided submissions.1 
To gauge the potential scope of market mech­
anisms in the forthcoming Paris agreement, this 
paper surveys the submitted INDCs on the 
question to what extent they envisage the use 
of market mechanisms. In detail, the paper
looks at five questions for each INDC: 
Does the INDC make any mention of market 
mechanisms? In the negotiations, some Parties 
have been strongly in favour of market mecha­
nisms while others have been strongly op­
posed.
Does the Party plan to use market mechanisms
to achieve its contribution to the Paris agree­
ment? The answer to this question will allow to
gauge the potential demand for units from 
market mechanisms under the new agreement.
In the Kyoto Protocol, various Parties were in
favour of market mechanisms but did not  
1 Submitted INDCs are available online at 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20 
Pages/submissions.aspx
themselves use them for compliance with their 
targets. 
If a Party intends to use market mechanisms, 
does the INDC specify which mechanisms or 
types of units the country intends to use? In
addition to the Kyoto mechanisms, Parties are 
discussion to establish a new market-based 
mechanism (NMM) under the Convention. Fur­
thermore, several Parties are in the process to 
develop bilateral mechanisms or to link domes­
tic emission trading systems (ETS), and the UN­
FCCC is discussing whether and how such na­
tionally-driven mechanisms could be governed 
under a UNFCCC Framework for Various Ap­
proaches (FVA). There are also discussions to 
use market mechanisms for reducing emission 
from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD+). 
Does the Party quantify the extent to which it
intends to use market mechanisms? Under the 
Kyoto Protocol, use of mechanisms has been 
supposed to be supplemental to domestic ac­
tion, though this principle has never been 
quantified.
Does the Party specify how the use of mecha­
nisms will ensure environmental integrity and
avoid double counting? The emergence of na­
tionally-driven mechanisms without UNFCCC 
oversight has given rise to concerns about their 
environmental integrity. Furthermore, a prolif­
eration of mechanisms may lead to double 
counting of emission reductions. Finally, market 
mechanisms will to a large extent operate with­
in the boundaries of countries’ contributions. If
not properly accounted for, emission reduc­
tions could be claimed by the host countries 







Intending to use international 
mechanisms as sellers 
Considering to use mechanisms 
Intending to use international 
mechanisms as buyers 
Intending to use only national 
mechanisms 
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2 Results
Of the 147 INDCs surveyed, 66 are intending 
and 20 are considering to use international
market mechanisms. The other Parties either do
not discuss the issue or explicitly or do not en­
visage use of international market mechanisms.
The following figures and Table I in the Annex 
provide an overview of the submissions. 
Of the 66 Parties that intend to use market 
mechanisms, 53 intend to be sellers. Typically, 
they stipulate that market mechanisms could 
be used to finance the conditional parts of their 
INDCs. The remaining thirteen Parties are con­
sidering to buy units: Canada, Costa Rica, Japan,
Liechtenstein, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, New 
Zealand, Norway, San Marino, South Korea,
Switzerland, and Turkey (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Use of Mechanisms 
Source: Wuppertal Institute 
 
Five of the Parties that do not intend to use in­
ternational market mechanisms highlight their 
use of domestic systems: China, the EU, Gabon,
Iceland and India. Egypt stipulates that it “may 
establish” a national market. In addition, a 
number of countries envisage using both inter­
national and domestic systems: Belize, Costa 
Rica, Ivory Coast, Liechtenstein, New Zealand,
Norway and South Korea.
Of the 86 Parties that may use international 
mechanisms, the majority does not specify
which mechanisms they intend to use. 23 Par­
ties specify the CDM, six REDD+, four the new 
market mechanism, four (credited) NAMAs, and 








Update on Market Mechanisms in Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
Only few Parties discuss limits on the use of 
mechanisms. Armenia stipulates that it will sell 
surplus units if emissions stay below its target. 
Japan expects to purchase 50-100 Mt CO2-eq. 
Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, San Marino, 
and Switzerland stipulate a primary focus on 
domestic reductions, but provide no quantifica­
tion. By contrast, New Zealand requires “unre­
stricted access” to market mechanisms.
35 Parties highlight that environmental integri­
ty needs to be preserved but only few go into 
details. Brazil stipulates that it will not recognise 
use by other Parties of emission reductions 
achieved on Brazilian territory that have been 
acquired through instruments outside the Con­
vention, the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris agree­
ment. Switzerland assumes that only the pur­
chasing country will account for the emission 
reductions covered by the credits. 
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3 Discussion  
While there is a high number of Parties that are 
intending or considering to use market mecha­
nisms, the vast majority of them intend to be 
sellers. In addition, these countries are mostly 
low-income countries which have so far not had 
much success in using the CDM. The buyer side 
is similarly limited. Only thirteen Parties intend
to be buyers, and only about half of them are 
large emitters (Canada, Japan, Mexico, South 
Korea and Turkey).
However, interest in markets is not limited to 
the 86 Parties considering to use international 
mechanisms. Several large emitters – China, the 
EU and India – that do not intend to use inter­
national market mechanisms highlight their use 
of domestic systems.
One may note that Kazakhstan and Switzerland 
have domestic systems but do not mention 
them in their INDCs. Similarly, a significant 
number of US states and Canadian provinces 
are already operating trading systems. 
The lack of emphasis on international markets 
in the INDC of the EU is somewhat odd, given 
its strong engagement in the discussions on the 
reform of existing and the development of new 
mechanisms. The EU has been the main driver 
of establishing the NMM and it has also advo­
cated for the inclusion of market mechanisms in
the Paris agreement, but as its INDC currently 
stands, it would not provide demand for such 
mechanisms in the post-2020 period. The same
applies to Norway for its 40% target, but it stip­
ulates its openness to adopting a stronger tar­
get with use of international mechanisms.
The US silence on markets is similarly some­
what surprising, given that various US states 
and Canadian provinces are already engaging 
in cross-border emission trading. To have clear 
accounting, these transfers should be account­
ed for when assessing the achievement of con­
tributions under the Paris agreement. The US 
had in the past acknowledged this necessity in
discussions on the FVA.
In summary, there are ongoing dynamics at na­
tional and sub-national levels, but the decline 
of the role of international mechanisms is un­
likely to be reversed soon. While many Parties 
want to use market mechanisms under the new 
agreement, only a very limited number want to 
do so as buyers, and these include only a few 
large emitters. This is mirrored by the interest 
on the seller side, which mostly comes from
low-income countries, which have so far not 
had much success in using the CDM.
In terms of mechanisms, there is a comparative­
ly strong call for continuation of the CDM (by 23 
countries), while only few countries specify the 
NMM or REDD+. The low-income countries that 
want to use mechanisms as sellers may indeed 
not have much scope for mechanisms at sec­
toral level, as envisaged for the NMM.
While the INDCs do not necessarily deliver a full 
picture, using them as basis suggests that re­
form of the existing CDM and capacity building 
for its use by low-income countries is a signifi­
cantly higher priority than development of new 
mechanisms. While indications of demand in 
the INDCs are low, the countries that want to 
use mechanisms as sellers will similarly not be
able to deliver a large supply. The future land­
scape may therefore be characterised by a bet­
ter balance of demand and supply than current­
ly, albeit at a low level. 
Large emitters are apparently taking the route 
of domestic emission trading systems rather 
than international mechanisms. While domestic 
emission trading systems could in theory be 
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political discussions these will in practice for the 
foreseeable future probably be limited to the 
regional level. The EU is discussing a link with 
Switzerland and there will likely be a North
American market at some point. Linkages 
across regions do currently not look likely to 
become a viable perspective before the mid­
2020s.
Figure 3: Mentions of Mechanisms in INDCs 
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Annex: 
Table 1: INDCs and Mention of Market Mechanisms
Country Any Mention of 
Market Mecha-
nisms? 




Limit on use of 
markets 
Integrity and Double Counting Use of Domestic Mar-
kets? 
Afghanistan No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Albania Yes Yes, as seller, to help with emission pathway and Not specified Not specified Supports “effective accounting rules to ensure envi- No mention 
sustainable development ronmental integrity of the mechanisms” 
Algeria No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Andorra Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 
Antigua and Bar- Yes Yes, as seller Reformed CDM Not specified Supports a “system No mention 
buda that guarantees transparency and environmental 
integrity, and delivers real, permanent and verified 
emissions reductions and ensures that double count­
ing is avoided.” 
Argentina No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Armenia Yes Yes, sale of surplus if emissions stay below its target Not specified Sale of surplus Not specified No mention 
units 
Australia No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 
Azerbajian No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Bahamas Yes Open to consider Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Bangladesh Yes Does not rule out use Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Barbados Yes Yes, as seller to achieve contribution CDM and NAMAs Not specified Not specified No mention 
Belarus No No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Belize Yes Intends to explore Not specified Not specified Willing to explore mechanisms that “prevent double Development of mecha­
counting” and “demonstrate environmental integri­ nisms to support energy 
ty” efficiency and renewable 
energy 
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Country Any Mention of 
Market Mecha-
nisms? 




Limit on use of 
markets 
Integrity and Double Counting Use of Domestic Mar-
kets? 
Bhutan Yes Yes, as seller, to fulfil contribution CDM or other 
mechanisms 
Not specified Not specified No mention 
Bolivia Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Yes Yes, as seller to support conditional reductions Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Botswana Yes Yes, as seller to achieve contribution Mechanisms un­
der the Conven­
tion 
Not specified Not specified No mention 
Brazil Yes Reserves its position N.a. N.a. Brazil will not recognise use by other Parties of emis­
sion reductions achieved on Brazilian territory that 
have been acquired through instruments outside the 
Convention, the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris agree­
ment. 
No mention 
Burkina Faso Yes Yes, supports use of CERs to achieve contribution CDM Not specified Accounting rules for environmental integrity and 
avoidance of double counting 
No mention 
Burundi Unclear Yes, intends to rely on “international compensation 
mechanisms” to compensate for economic losses 
from mitigation activities. 
“Compensation 
mechanisms” 
N.a. N.a. No mention 
Cambodia Yes Yes, as seller to channel finance Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Cameroon Yes Yes, as seller to help finance parts of INDC Not specified Not specified Need for an appropriate accounting framework, en­
vironmental integrity and transparency 
No mention 
Canada Yes Yes, as buyer Not specified Not specified Use of mechanisms is “subject to robust systems that 
deliver real and verified emissions reductions” 
No mention 
Cape Verde Yes Yes, as seller to finance conditional measures CDM, NMM, cred­
ited NAMAs 





Yes Yes, as seller to help finance investments CDM Not specified Not specified No mention 
Chad Yes Yes, as seller to encourage investments CDM, REDD+ Not specified Not specified No mention 
Chile Yes Does not rule out use Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
China Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. Yes, domestic ETS 
  7  
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Country Any Mention of 
Market Mecha-
nisms? 




Limit on use of 
markets 
Integrity and Double Counting Use of Domestic Mar-
kets? 
Colombia Yes Will explore use Not specified Not specified The use of market mechanisms „that guarantee the 
principles of transparency and environmental integ­
rity ... and prevent double counting“. 
No mention 
Comoros No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Cook Island No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Costa Rica Yes Yes, reserves right to buy to accomplish reduction 
goal 
Not specified Not specified Compensation units traded abroad will be registered 




Cuba Yes No, market mechanisms are unstable and volatile, 
industrialised countries need to prioritise public 
funding 
N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 
Democratic Re-
public of the Con-
go 
No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Djibouti No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Dominica Yes Yes, as seller to promote efficiency and in the 
transport sector 
Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Dominican Re-
public 
Yes Yes, considers that it has potential Not specified Not specified Must ensure environmental integrity nationaly and 
internationally 
No mention 
Ecuador No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Egypt Yes Not specified Not specified Not specified Not specified National market for car­
bon trading “may be 
established”, “may further 
be developed into re­
gional market” 
El Salvador No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 
Equatorial Guinea Yes Yes, as seller, INDC conditional on correction ofd­
istortions of existing mechanims 
Not specified Not specified Target conditional on correction of distortions of 
existing market mechanisms 
No mention 
Eritrea No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Ethiopia Yes Yes, as a seller Not specified Not specified Supports „the development of effective accounting 
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Country Any Mention of 
Market Mecha-
nisms? 




Limit on use of 
markets 
Integrity and Double Counting Use of Domestic Mar-
kets? 
EU Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. Yes, EU ETS 
Fiji Yes Yes, to achieve conditional target CDM or compara- Not specified No mention No mention 
ble 
Gabon Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. Yes, domestic SD offsets 
Gambia Yes Yes, as seller to reach conditional reductions CDM and NMM Not specified Need for standards that „deliver real, permanent, No mention 
additional and verified mitigation outcomes, avoid 
double counting of emissions“ 
Georgia No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Ghana Yes Yes, as seller, access to mechanisms important com- Not specified Not specified Mechanisms „must have robust accounting rules and No mention 
ponent to mobilise support to achieve conditional stadards, avoid double counting and ensure en­
target vironmental integrity“ 
Grenada Yes Willing to explore Not specified Not specified Need for environmental integrity No mention 
Guatemala Yes Considering participation Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Guinea Yes Yes, as seller, to help finance investments CDM Not specified Need for an appropriate accounting system No mention 
Guinea Bissau No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 
Guyana Yes Yes, as seller REDD+ Not specified „Guyana‟s robust MRV system can ensure the integ- No mention 
rity of our emission reduction efforts“ 
Haiti Yes Yes, as seller, to finance parts of conditional INDC New mechanism Not specified New mechanism to be guided by principles of en- No mention 
like CDM vironmental integrity, transparency, and absence of 
double counting 
Honduras No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Iceland Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. Yes, EU ETS 
India Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. Yes, Perform Achieve and 
Trade (PAT), Renewable 
Energy Certificates (REC), 
Renewable Purchase Ob­
ligation (RPO) 
Indonesia Yes Maybe, as seller, to support own efforts Welcomes “bilat­
eral, regional and 
international mar­
ket mechanisms” 
Not specified Not specified No mention 
  9  
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Country Any Mention of 
Market Mecha-
nisms? 




Limit on use of 
markets 
Integrity and Double Counting Use of Domestic Mar-
kets? 
Iran Yes Yes, as seller, to implement conditional actions Not specified Not specified Not specified Yes 
Israel No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Ivory Coast Yes Yes, as seller, to help finance investments CDM Not specified Environmental integrity and transparenc Studies opportunities for 
domestic and regional 
systems 
Japan Yes Yes, as buyer JCM Expects 50-100 Not specified No mention 
Mt 
Jordan Yes Yes, as seller, wants to increase the involvement in Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
carbon markets. 
Kazakhstan Yes Retains option to use UNFCCC mecha- Not specified Not specified No mention 
nisms 
Kenya Yes Does not rule out use Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Kiribati Yes Yes, as seller, to support establishment and opera- Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
tion of a National Climate Change Trust Fund 
Kyrgyzstan No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Lao Peple's De- Yes Yes, as seller to achieve contribution Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
mocratic Republic 
Lebanon Yes Not at present, but does not exclude possibility Maybe CDM Not specified Not specified No mention 
Lesotho Yes Retains possibility to use to achieve conditional Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
and/or unconditional targets 
Liberia Yes Yes, as seller, to finance part of INDC Mechanism such Not specified Supports „carbon credits taking into account en- No mention 
as the CDM vironmental integrity“ 
Liechtenstein Yes Yes, as buyer Not specified “Primary focus Not specified Yes, EU ETS 
on domestic” 
Macedonia Yes Will consider use Maybe NMM Not specified No specified No mention 
Madagascar Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 
Malawi No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Maldives No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Mali Yes Yes, as seller as part of means of implementation CDM Not specified Not specified No mention 
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Country Any Mention of 
Market Mecha-
nisms? 




Limit on use of 
markets 
Integrity and Double Counting Use of Domestic Mar-
kets? 
Mauritania Yes Yes, as seller to support financing needs CDM Not specified Not specified No mention 
Mauritius No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Mexico Yes Yes, as buyer for conditional target Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Micronesia Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 








Use „subject to robust systems that deliver real and 
verified emissions reductions.“ 
No mention 





Emphasis on real, additional, permanent and verifi­
able nature of net emissions reductions 
No mention 
Mongolia Yes Yes, as seller to implement measures Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Montenegro Yes Yes, as seller Not specified Not specified Use of mechanisms is to be conditional on having 
effective accounting rules developed under the UN­
FCCC to ensure the environmental integrity of the 
mechanisms. 
No mention 
Morocco Yes Yes, may be used for conditional and/or uncondi­
tional target 
Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Mozambique Yes Yes, as seller, to get access to clean technologies Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Myanmar Yes Yes, intends to build capacity to participate Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Namibia Yes Does not rule out use to achieve conditional target Not specified Not specified Demands „agreed accounting rules“ No mention 
Nauru No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 




Standards that ensure environmental integrity, pre­
vention of double-claiming/double-counting, and 
transparency in accounting 
Yes, NZ ETS 
Niger Yes Yes, as seller Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
 11  
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Country Any Mention of 
Market Mecha-
nisms? 




Limit on use of 
markets 
Integrity and Double Counting Use of Domestic Mar-
kets? 
Norway Yes Yes, as buyer. Either joint fulfillment with EU with full Full use of EU flex- Not specified EU ETS ensures that no double counting, will seek Yes, EU ETS 
access to EU flexibilities and no use of UNFCCC ibilities or use of agreement on non-ETS sectors 
mechanisms, or use of UNFCCC mechanisms; possi­
ble target beyond 40% with use of UNFCCC mecha-
UNFCCC mecha­
nisms 
If individual, will apply strict criteria 
nisms 
Oman No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Pakistan No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Papua New Guinea No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Paraguay Yes Yes, as seller as means of support Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Peru Yes Yes, as seller if compatible with target Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Philippines No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Qatar No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Republic of the No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Congo 
Russia Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 
Rwanda Yes Yes, as seller to achieve green growth strategy CDM, NAMAs, Not specified Supports “the development of effective accounting No mention 
REDD+ rules under the UNFCCC to guarantee the environ­
mental integrity of market mechanisms” 
Saint Lucia Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. Cap-and-trade and offset­
ting to be pursued 
Saint Vincent and Yes Yes, as seller to finance part of mitigation target CDM, REDD+, Not specified Supports environmental integrity and transparency No mention 
Grenadines NAMA in transport 
sector 
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Country Any Mention of 
Market Mecha-
nisms? 




Limit on use of 
markets 
Integrity and Double Counting Use of Domestic Mar-
kets? 
San Marino Yes Yes, as buyer, if domestic measures insufficient to 
achieve target 










Not specified No mention 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Yes Yes, as seller to support INDC Not specified Not specified Market mechanisms “with high environmental integ­
rity, contributing to sustainable development” 
No mention 
Saudi Arabia No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Senegal Yes Yes, as seller Not specified Not specified “Will be host to any international mechanism that 
assures real, permanent, supplementary and verified 
emission reductions that avoid double counting and 
respond to its sustainable development objectives” 
No mention 
Serbia No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 
Seychelles Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 
Sierra Leone Yes Yes, as seller to help finance investments mentioned 
in INDC 
Instruments such 
as the CDM 
Not specified Carbon assets should take into account environmen­
tal integrity and transparency 
No mention 
Singapore Yes Maybe, as buyer Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Solomon Islands Yes Will consider use to support National Trust Fund Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Somalia No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
South Africa No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 




11.3% of BAU 
emissions in 
2030 
Use is to be “in accordance with relevant rules and 
standards” 
Yes, domestic ETS 
South Sudan Yes Yes, as seller to access finance CDM and REDD+ Not specified Not specified No mention 
  13  
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Country Any Mention of 
Market Mecha-
nisms? 




Limit on use of 
markets 
Integrity and Double Counting Use of Domestic Mar-
kets? 
Sri Lanka No No N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 
Sudan Yes Does not exclude use in implementing contribution Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Suriname Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 
Swaziland Yes Yes, as a seller, converting mitigation actions to cred- CDM or similar Not specified Use of internationally recognized accounting princi- No mention 
its ples and MRV standards 
Switzerland Yes Yes, as buyer CDM, NMM and INDC achieve- Quality criteria at least in line with current Swiss legis- No mention 
FVA ment “mainly lation 
domestically” Assumes only purchasing Party will account for re­
ductions 
Tajikistan No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Thailand Yes Will study potential  Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Togo Yes Yes, as seller CDM, REDD+ Not specified Not specified No mention 
Trinidad and To- No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
bago 
Tunisia Yes Yes, as seller to support specific actions Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Turkey Yes Yes, as buyer Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Turkmenistan No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Uganda Yes Yes, as seller to meet commitments and/or increase Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
level of contribution 
Ukraine Yes Yes Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
United Arab Emira- No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
tes 
United Republic of No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Tanzania 
USA Yes No N.a. N.a. N.a. No mention 
Uruguay No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Vanuatu No N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 
Vietnam Yes Yes, as seller Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 






Update on Market Mechanisms in Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
Country Any Mention of 
Market Mecha-
nisms? 




Limit on use of 
markets 
Integrity and Double Counting Use of Domestic Mar-
kets? 
Zambia Yes Does not rule out use to meet reduction target Not specified Not specified Not specified No mention 
Zimbabwe Yes Yes, as a seller to mobilise resources Not specified N.a. N.a. No mention 
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